

SOCRIS FINAL REPORT (ANN 120360)

Career development

The project opened up important possibilities concerning the research careers of all Hungarian project members. Zsófia Nagy had got a PhD degree during the project inter alia by using qualitative research results and experiences made in the SOCRIS project, while Zsuzsanna Ádám intends to get a PhD degree in sociology and recently writes her dissertation using the SOCRIS database for her quantitative analyses. István Grajczjár used up both quantitative and qualitative research results of the project to writing his habilitation theses and got a habilitated doctor degree in sociology. The project members participated in several national and international conferences and workshops (inter alia in Budapest, Vienna, Newcastle, Florence), published research results of the project in German, English and Hungarian in different national and international journals, moreover gave research seminars and lectures for years in the participated universities by using both quantitative and qualitative data of the project. Besides, there are already finalized and planned BA theses based on the SOCRIS data and interviews supervised by the project members.

Planned papers:

Grajczjár, István – Nagy, Zsófia – Örkény, Antal (2021): Consequences of Authoritarian Populism on Solidarity in Hungary. Manuscript for Special issue proposal for *Government & Opposition: Populism in Power and its Consequences: Politics, Polity and Policies*. Edited by Manuela Caiani (SNS, Florence), Tiago Carvalho (SNS, Florence), Paolo Graziano (University of Padua)

Grajczjár, István – Nagy, Zsófia – Örkény, Antal (2021): Complex explanations for different solidarity patterns in Hungary: a qualitative and quantitative synthesis.

Grajczjár, István – Nagy, Zsófia – Örkény, Antal (2021): The more deprived, the more solidarian? Different patterns of relative deprivations as drivers of inclusive solidarity.

Project-related participation in international scientific/scholarly conferences:

British Sociological Association Annual Conference 2018: Identity, Community and Social Solidarity

Carina Altreiter-István Grajczjár: Who's in, who's out? Socio-economic change and antagonistic formations of solidarity; <https://www.britsoc.co.uk/events/key-bsa-events/bsa-annual-conference/>

37th International Labor Process Conference, Vienna, Austria, 24-26 April 2019. ILPC 2019. Presentations: Grajczjár I.: Political orientations and attitudes towards refugees of different solidarity clusters in Austria and Hungary; Zsófia Nagy: Workplace recognition and solidarity in Hungary in times of crises

4th International ESS Conference, Turbulent times in Europe: Instability, insecurity and inequality, 15-17 April 2019, University of Mannheim, Germany: Grajczjár, István; Örkény, Antal & Nagy, Zsófia: The effect of socio-economic changes on changes on attitudes towards different types of solidarity - a changing European landscape

Onlinetagung - Universität Tübingen: Rechter Wärmestrom und eiskalte Verwilderung Solidarität, Rechtspopulismus und Exklusion. István Grajczjár Wien/Budapest: Solidarity in a hybrid regime in times of crises: the case of Hungary. Montag, 30. März 2020, 12:30-18:15 Uhr; Dienstag, 31. März 2020, 13:00-21:00 Uhr

Populism in Power and its Consequences: Politics, Polity and Policies; 24 & 25 October 2019; Scuola Normale Superiore; Department of Political and Social Sciences, Palazzo Strozzi (5° floor), Florence.

Istvan Grajczjar (Milton Friedman University, Budapest): An illiberal hybrid regime in practice within the EU: authoritarian populism in Hungary

Most important lectures held:

Research practice: Democratization and radicalization in Europe; University of Vienna, 4 semesters

Research practice: Inclusive and exclusive solidarity; University of Vienna, 2 semesters

Socio-economic changes and the appeal of the extreme right in Europe – Erasmus 3 semesters; Milton Friedman University (MFU)

Political radicalism – Erasmus 3 semesters; MFU

Social diagnoses: an international outlook; MFU

Quantitative research-practice seminar; MFU

Hungary in numbers; MFU

Sociology of the crisis; MFU

Social-research seminar; MFU

Organisation of symposia and conferences

37th International Labor Process Conference, Vienna, Austria, 24-26 April 2019. ILPC 2019. Stream Organisers: Jörg Flecker (University of Vienna), Annika Schönauer (FORBA, Austria), Saskja Schindler (University of Vienna), István Grajczjár (MFU, Budapest).

Project homepage:

The lease of the website has been extended until 2022: www.socris-project.com

Research results

Summary and conclusions of longitudinal investigations concerning routes from perceptions of socio-economic changes (SEC) to right-wing populism

The economic crisis of 2008 has severely affected citizens all over Europe, leading to high levels of insecurity and declining trust in public institutions. Parallel, in the past ten years, populist parties, namely those on the radical right, have enjoyed considerable success across Europe. This success has attracted the attention of an increasing number of scholars and political commentators from a wide variety of disciplines. As recent European and national elections showed, they are indeed becoming even more attractive to a significant part of the electorate. But do reactions to the consequences of the crisis and experiences of deprivation necessarily lead to more authoritarianism, ethnonationalism, and xenophobia and, through these to affinity to right-wing populism and extremism? We tried to answer this question in this paper comparing two countries hit very differently by the socio-economic crisis that began in 2008 but showed similar tendencies concerning right-wing radicalization since then: Austria and Hungary. Both of the chosen countries took part both in the SIREN and the SOCRIS projects, which – inter alia – investigated the link between the perceptions of socio-economic changes and political orientations of employees: the SIREN survey was conducted in 2003, while the SOCRIS in 2017.

Only employees who have been active for at least five years on the labor market (N=2800; 1400 in each country) belonged to the investigated population, and so, they could have enough experiences concerning socio-economic changes in the world of work, more precisely, in their workplaces.

So, this summary will map the perceptions of, and reactions to, the socio-economic changes and will link these to political orientations of employees in Austria and Hungary over time. The analysis will show to what extent these developments have fuelled exclusivist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes, and increased the attraction to the populist radical right. The following investigation will analyse individual reactions to the crisis as being influenced by people's particular employment and working conditions, their class positions, and the value judgments and political orientations these may imply, by the protection or exposure people experience depending on their social status as well as by shifting feelings of belonging.

Research questions were as follows:

- How do people perceive changes in their working and living conditions over time?
- What different attitudes and political orientations do people develop or strengthen in dealing with the consequences of the crisis?
- How do such changes and their perceptions impact on political orientations before and after the crisis?
- To what extent, where and relating to which groups of employees can the changes make people receptive to right-wing populism and extremism and, in particular, to xenophobia, nationalism and racism in the different rounds?
- What changes can be observed concerning attitudinal and political reactions of employees to socio-economic changes and crises between countries and survey rounds?
- What are the differences and similarities between Austria and Hungary, and how can these be explained?

Country conclusions – Hungary

Our longitudinal results show that perceptions of socio-economic changes have improved over time in Hungary: this is most probably due to the fact that the financial crisis of 2008 and its effects on the labor market (moreover its consequences on the social and political field) hit the employees more heavily and deeply than the neoliberal changes on the labor market in the late 90s/early 2000s. Younger employees and those with higher status are the *subjective* winners of changes. Although the level of subjective wellbeing has slightly grown, Hungarian employees (particularly compared to their Austrian colleagues) still report immense feelings of deprivation, lack of appreciation and injustice, very similar to the year 2003. Again, only younger employees and those with a higher status (and *subjective* winners of changes) reported higher level of appreciation and wellbeing. What's more, *younger age and higher status are new explanatory phenomena concerning appreciation*, which strengthens the winner feelings of these groups on the labor market. But social attachment – and, through this, the general integration level on the labor market – became weaker for the majority of employees than earlier. Subjective losers of the changes and younger employees reported less social attachment. But *employees with a higher status, moreover, workers of the public sector, have become*

more integrated (socially attached) on the labor market than in 2003. All these point out a serious polarization tendency on the labor market in Hungary.

Surprisingly, the degrees of almost all receptiveness attitudes have decreased between 2003 and 2017 in Hungary. But it is important to emphasize here that the only attitude which has sky-rocketed in the country over time is xenophobia. The second wave of the financial crisis of 2012 had a significant effect on xenophobia as we know from the results of ESS data from 2012 and 2014 (own calculation). This growing tendency was enormously strengthened due to the political reactions of the right-wing parties to the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. Namely, it caused a kind of moral panic in the society and benefited first of all Orbán and his party, as we saw from the comparison of the 2014 and 2016 ESS data (own calculation). However, labor market variables have not shown any correlations with growing xenophobia between 2014 and 2016 in neither of the countries (own calculation).

Nevertheless, we found that belonging to disadvantaged social groups can clearly be a seed-bad of receptiveness attitudes. Employees with lower social status (lower education and occupational position) are more inclined to show more social dominance orientation (SDO), authoritarianism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism or political powerlessness, while lower subjective status (deprivation and less subjective wellbeing) correlates “only” with political powerlessness in Hungary. *Employees having fixed term contracts have become more social dominance oriented and politically powerless* after the crises. According to the literature, this can be a normal pathological reaction of the loser of the changes (see Mudde, 2010). Deprived persons working among precarious conditions or living among disadvantageous circumstances can feel discriminated and be easily disappointed with the ruling regime and lose trust in the mainstream political forces.

Lower status, however, can lead to the other above mentioned receptiveness attitudes as well. Ethnocentrism plays a status-compensative role as imaginary integration into the nation, since its “natural” superiority as “community of the majority” is unquestionable (Anderson 2006). SDO appears as a moral superiority feeling along a double demarcation logic against the unmerited corrupt elite “up there” on the one hand and, against the “lazy scroungers” downwards on the other hand. Authoritarianism is a tool to punish people violating conventions and restoring order by creating dominance of the “merited” in the society, while xenophobia is partly a consequence of the fear of insecurity, (ethnic) competition for jobs and for social benefits (Lipset 1966) and it partly embodies the general out-group rejection resulting from the above-mentioned receptiveness attitudes.

But also groups being in a more advantaged situation are threatened by radicalization in Hungary: younger employees, subjective winner groups, appreciated employees or those who reported more subjective wellbeing are more social dominance oriented and show a higher degree of ethnocentrism: higher subjective status can lead to a higher level of SDO and ethnocentrism by emphasizing meritocratic views and defending the status quo and the ethnic community: the ruling power and the integrity of the virtuous and superior national majority (Flecker 2007).


Besides, employees of the public sector are clearly radicalized in Hungary as well: they seem to be more ‘integrated’ on the labor market, but also are more ethnocentric and authoritarian and *xenophobic in a growing extent* (more than in 2003) than employees of the private sector. The question is whether this radicalization process could be explained by a kind of feudal constraints enforced by the government and fear of job loss, high level of conformism (self-surrender or loyalty without

criticism), justification of the new order or even the classic authoritarian subjection in the public sector? We still don't know it surely; this is a question of further investigations.

As we know, right-wing radicalization in the sense of supporting far-right parties is rather a complicated phenomenon in Hungary, since Fidesz and the Orbán government partly occupied the far-right position in the political field. All in all, the *affinity to right-wing populism and extremism became significantly stronger since 2003*, be it about Fidesz or Jobbik. Jobbik has supporters rather from the younger, deprived, disappointed authoritarian block, while Orbán from the xenophobic *high-subjective-status-holder* block having strong trust in him and his charisma. But, 'hard' socio-demographic variables do not influence the affinity either to Jobbik or the Orbán government: far-right sympathizers can be found practically in all strata of the Hungarian society.

Nevertheless, based on our step by step models, perceptions of changes (SEC) do not seem to influence these affinities directly.


Therefore, by using path models for analysing latent effects of perceptions of SEC it is to be stated that Orbán addressed first of all the *subjective* winners of his regime successfully: there are *exclusively winner routes* that lead to the satisfaction with the Orbán-government among employees.



In this model subjective (probably felt as merited) winner positions combined with strong workplace integration and with an authoritarian organization of work and authoritarian demand keeping up winner workplace positions are to be explored as socio-psychological drivers that lead to overheated ethnocentrism/nationalism and out-group rejection (xenophobia), which meet the most important populist buzzwords of the Orbán government on the one hand. On the other hand, the appreciation in the workplace via the meritocratic and superior character of SDO gives the feeling to the *subjective* winners of the regime that Hungary is one of the best countries of the world that should be defended at any costs (ethno-nationalism). Besides, appreciation via superiority feeling as support of the just hierarchy leads to the unquestionable trust in the Orbánian world as well. What's more, there is a direct winner route leading from SEC to satisfaction with the Orbán government without any right-wing ideological influence, which clearly shows that a winner perception is well enough to support a far-right political force in a governing position. Nevertheless, this model offers a much stronger

explanatory power than that of MIÉP or Jobbik, i.e., these observations are the most valid among the investigations done in Hungary.

Analysing the Jobbik path model in 2017, we can observe only an indirect effect of xenophobia in explanation of affinity to Jobbik, due perhaps to the xenophobic Orbánian politics.



In contrast to the path model leading to satisfaction with the Orbán-government, xenophobia and political powerlessness characterize loser routes in the case of Jobbik. All other receptiveness attitudes characterize the subjective winners of changes. However, among people with higher perceptions of SEC, Jobbik can only rely on a small, dissatisfied radical group that has either been originally authoritarian, or has become authoritarian through SDO, xenophobia or ethnocentrism: but they are easily to sniff away by Fidesz. Moreover – as mentioned – the explanatory power of this model is much weaker than that of the Orbán government.

This shows fatal divisions of employee groups in Hungary: there can be observed 1) a radicalized subjective winner group supporting the governing coalition, 2) a much smaller radicalized loser group (with some disappointed radicalized winners arm-in-arm) supporting an even more disappearing far-right opposition party, and 3) all other disappointed and still not radicalized groups being in a minority position.

All in all, there is a wide permeation of right-wing radicalism among different social strata in Hungary, most probably due to the hard experiences of the multiple socio-economic political and moral crises of 2008-2012 among the majority of employees and to the moral panic after the so-called refugee crisis in 2015. This does not mean, however, that RWE attitudes would generally have become stronger after the crisis: what is more, most of them have become somewhat weaker on the average compared to 2003. But the already high level of xenophobia and the affinity to far-right parties have grown significantly. According to the ESS 2016 data, the largest level of xenophobia is to be observed in Hungary compared to the investigated European countries (own calculation). In sum, in all social strata, people received enough far-right attitudinal and ideological scapegoating munition from Fidesz and Jobbik to creating a radicalized majority against the left-liberal political forces. Nevertheless, the majority of subjective winners are clearly convinced that the recovery from the crises is only due to

the Orbánian governance. The picture is even clearer if we take into consideration that the extreme right (Fidesz and Jobbik together) includes more than two-thirds of the active voters in Hungary. Practically, the extreme right political ideology is common ground also in the world of work today in Hungary.

Country conclusions - Austria

All in all, in Austria the rather high level of social attachment/labor market integration and positive perceptions of SEC did not change between 2003 and 2017, but levels of subjective wellbeing and appreciation have increased strongly. Neither degrees of xenophobia nor authoritarianism, nor FPÖ affinity have changed over time, while levels of ethnocentrism, political powerlessness and SDO have decreased significantly (this latter is still much higher than the Hungarian one, however).

Similarly to Hungary, younger employees percept more positive SEC, while more subjective wellbeing characterize younger employees, those with higher status and winners of changes. Older respondents and winners of changes reported more social attachment. Subjective wellbeing and winner positions play important roles in feelings of appreciation and, higher status has also become a significant explanatory variable of appreciation in 2017, which shows a more intensive polarization trend on the Austrian labor market as well.


Lower status is a seed-bad of receptiveness attitudes in Austria, too: employees with lower status are more inclined to show more SDO, authoritarianism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism (this one to a growing extent) or political powerlessness. More social attachment correlates with more authoritarianism, while more deprivation correlates with more xenophobia and political powerlessness here. More social attachment, however, is a new influencing factor in political powerlessness in 2017. Men and older employees were more inclined to be more ethnocentric in Austria in both rounds. But people reported less wellbeing and employees with fixed-term contracts have become more ethnocentric in 2017 too, while older employees have become more inclined to SDO to a growing extent. Besides, full time employees showed more authoritarianism in 2017.

According to the results of bivariate analyses, FPÖ affinity can be characterized by more support of men, moreover by deprivation, but at the same time also by winner positions, full-time work-system and more social attachment in a growing extent since 2003. Moreover, FPÖ affinity is correlated with lower social status and all receptiveness RWE attitudes, like xenophobia, political powerlessness, authoritarianism, SDO and ethnocentrism in both rounds. What's more, the effect of xenophobia on FPÖ affinity *increased* significantly over time. But similarly to Hungary, we should not forget the probably most important impact concerning the rise of xenophobia in explanation RWPA: the so-called refugee crisis in 2015.

However, in the step by step final model, only the effects of a lower degree of education, more social attachment, political powerlessness and xenophobia remained in the explanation of FPÖ affinity. Still, signs of both winner and loser routes seem to appear in the explanations of FPÖ affinity and, FPÖ supporters seem to be recruited more frequently from groups working as full-time employees. But in Austria we did not find a direct effect of perceptions of SEC on FPÖ affinity in either of the rounds when socio-demographic variables were controlled.

Analysing the FPÖ path models as indirect, latent routes of radicalization from perceptions of SEC to FPÖ affinity (without controlling socio-demographic variables), we found that the most important changes in Austria in 2017 compared to 2003 is that winner routes, mostly with the intermediate role

of social attachment, get 1) directly, and also via 2) political disappointment, 3) SDO or 4) xenophobia to affinity to the FPÖ. This shows the strengthening relative weight of winner routes in the radicalization process.



However, there are interesting changes on the loser routes as well. Collective relative deprivation (CRD) and political powerlessness lead to FPÖ on loser routes, what's more, CRD takes a direct effect on FPÖ affinity in 2017. What makes the Austrian situation especially interesting is the attachment of people of both winner and loser positions through workplace integration on the winner route or via deprivation on the loser route to FPÖ affinity, directly. They do not need (or they hide) the acceptance of the radical far-right ideology like in 2003. And, as if the earlier strong and coherent attitudinal basis behind FPÖ affinity would rather be loosened, too. This is hard to explain based on our results. It might be because employees are dissatisfied with the traditional party system and politics (political powerlessness), or employees wish - to a larger extent and a broader society based - for a new style political life for Austria and FPÖ makes them believe in this.

What's more, the explanatory power of the model is much stronger in 2017 than in 2003, i.e. the observed tendencies and routes are more valid and show more widespread acceptance of FPÖ politics than before the crisis of 2008.

Comparing country results and answering research questions

Answering our first question, employees in Austria showed a higher level of feeling of subjective wellbeing and more positive perceptions of SEC, moreover, a lower level of political powerlessness and ethnocentrism both in 2003 and 2017 rounds than their Hungarian colleagues, but the differences were not too large between countries. Much more significant differences are observed concerning the levels of appreciation, social attachment, authoritarianism and xenophobia: more social attachment and appreciation. Moreover, less authoritarianism and xenophobia characterized the employees of Austria in both rounds. The level of SDO, however, was significantly lower in both rounds in Hungary.

Answering our second question, **perceptions of socio-economic changes** increased positively over time in Hungary, while no change can be observed concerning SEC in Austria (its absolute level is similar in 2017 in both countries). As already mentioned, it is probably due to the fact that the crisis that started in 2008 hit Hungary much more than Austria, where the perceptions of changes were very

similar in both phases. The level of **subjective wellbeing** increased in both countries in 2017 compared to 2003, however, in a larger extent in Austria. This means that the employees' assessments of their subjective status is better after the crisis of 2008 than before in both countries. The feelings of **appreciation (the opposite of collective relative deprivation, CRD)** has not changed over time in Hungary, while it has significantly increased in Austria. So, the more positive perceptions of SEC do not mean automatically that employees in Hungary would feel more appreciation in the workplace to a larger extent. This is strengthened by the fact that the level of **social attachment**, and so integrative tendencies, decreased over time in Hungary, while no change can be observed in Austria.

In sum, in Austria the levels of labor market integration (attachment), feelings of appreciation and the wellbeing of employees are stronger than in Hungary, so Austrian employees are clearly winners - in the sense of showing higher and more stable subjective status - compared to their Hungarian colleagues.

Interestingly, the levels of almost all **receptiveness attitudes** decreased over time in both countries (**SDO** and **ethnocentrism** in a larger extent in Austria than in Hungary) except for xenophobia, which significantly increased between 2003 and 2017 in Hungary (the levels of authoritarianism and xenophobia did not change in Austria). It partly indicates that the crises of 2008 and 2015 had small or even inverse effects on several receptiveness attitudes in both countries, but a large increasing effect on the xenophobia in Hungary.

However, answering our third (and partly the fourth questions too), perceptions of SEC do not seem to influence *directly* receptiveness attitudes or political orientations in either of the countries and rounds (or the effects are rather weak) in particular, when socio-demographic and labor market variables are under control. This means that we have no clear-cut evidence that *perceptions of changes* on the labor market caused by the crisis that started in 2008 would affect *directly and to a significantly growing extent*, political orientations of employees in Austria and Hungary and, in addition, the suspected effects of the so-called refugee crisis also confuse the picture. In right-wing radicalization, besides receptiveness attitudes, we see rather growing effects of subjective status (wellbeing, social attachment and appreciation), full-time work-system and labor market attachments (FPÖ) or the public sector (Orbán-government). Fixed-term contracts seem to be playing an even more intensive role in SDO and political powerlessness in Hungary, and in ethnocentrism in Austria. However, these labor market effects are not too outstanding.

Although, there can be observed some latent, underlying tendencies in both countries connected (mostly via different socio-psychological drivers) to socio-economic changes. This is important since we wanted to present the dynamics of far-right radicalization processes and demonstrate possible ways of thinking and socio-psychological routes (using only cognitive and attitudinal variables) from the perceptions of socio-economic changes to right-wing party affinity (regardless of the influence of "hard" background factors like socio-demographic and labor market variables).

Answering our further (5th and 6th) questions, in Austria winner routes clearly dominate the political radicalization process, be it attitudinal one or linked to party affinity. Political powerlessness, xenophobia and also SDO to some extent, are the dominant attitudes on the routes to FPÖ in 2017, but only distrust in politics belongs to both winner and loser routes, surprisingly, which shows a rather general disappointment from mainstream politics in Austria. All other attitudes (SDO, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and authoritarianism) strengthen winner routes. What's more, the effect of xenophobia

on FPÖ affinity (that belongs only to the winner route after the crisis) is significantly stronger in 2017 than in 2003. All these developments could meet the xenophobic, racist and anti-mainstream political slogans of the FPÖ, which could play very important roles in the success of FPÖ at the 2017 elections.

In Hungary, as mentioned, the situation is more complicated. The Orbán government and the Fidesz – as a new player on the far-right populist political field – addressed practically the subjective winners of changes among employees successfully. It is reflected by the fact that employees who strongly support Fidesz are the subjective winners of the extreme right governance (regardless of sex, age, and social status) and only winner routes lead to satisfaction with the Orbán government. Nevertheless, Fidesz seems to occupy the majority of the far-right political field via its radical right buzzwords, xenophobia and ethnocentrism directly, while SDO and authoritarianism as important drivers, indirectly influence affinity to the Orbán government. Nevertheless, as presented, subjective winners are dearly inclined to support a far-right government directly, without any ideological impulse.

Thus, we can state, when far-right politics get into a governmental position, which also means it is widely supported by voters like in the case of Fidesz, socio-psychological demarcation lines are more manifest. Those who consider themselves as winners are attached to the Orbán-government, and, considering the election results, it covers a significant social group in various segments of the social hierarchy. At the same time, receptiveness attitudes (authoritarianism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism) demonstrate that the ideological narrative of Fidesz finds its audience in the wider society, associated by political trust: all this is based first of all on the image of the common national enemy, namely the migrant and refugee that only Fidesz and a strong-handed leadership can save the Hungarian nation from.

Although Jobbik could address both disappointed winners and losers with the help of different dominance of attitudes, Jobbik affinity, however, is not to be explained by a strong explanatory-power-characterized path-model. This shows that these routes and attitudes (even more) characterize sympathizers of other parties as well (first of all sympathizers of Fidesz). In the case of Jobbik, neither socio-demographic differences nor receptiveness attitudes play an important part in who is attracted to or rejects its extreme-right ideology. Voters of Jobbik as a minority can be found in each segment of the society without a strong ideological or social basis. Thus, we can state that Orbán and Fidesz took the wind out of Jobbik's sails and snatched all the important buzzwords (combined with a political trust in a governing position), which earlier characterized rather Jobbik voters and sympathizers.

Comparing research results between countries concerning solidarity

As mentioned, the economic crisis begun in 2008 has drastically changed the working and living conditions of many people in Europe. Indeed, times of crises appear to be an ideal moment for the populist radical right to prosper. However, in recent years we could also observe new waves of democratic protest and solidarity movements across Europe, ranging from supporting charitable initiatives and local initiatives protecting people from eviction to participating in international protests against austerity measures. How can these different reactions be explained? A further important goal of the SOCRIS project was to explore the emergence and strengthening of inclusivist and democratic-solidary political orientations as well. Besides, SOCRIS wanted to go beyond the contrast between „authoritarian-exclusivist“ and „democratic-solidary“ political orientations by conceptualising this confrontation as a symbolic struggle over different forms of solidarity, i.e. „open“ and „closed“, inclusivist and exclusivist solidarity in Austria and Hungary.

In the followings, we summarize our most important findings concerning different types of solidarity in the investigated countries.

- 1) We were able to distinguish identical solidarity clusters in Austria and Hungary (inclusive solidary, inclusive non-solidary, exclusive solidary and exclusive non-solidary clusters – see Kriesi 2015): in Hungary, exclusive patterns, while in Austria, inclusive patterns dominate the active aged population.
- 2) Cluster characteristics appear to be more coherent in Austria than in Hungary: members of inclusive clusters are rather deprived and politically disillusioned compared to exclusive ones in Hungary, but they support social and cultural minorities in need and are politically left-oriented. Exclusive clusters, however, feel appreciated, but they refuse cultural minorities and support the right-wing populist governing parties.
- 3) In Austria, the inclusive non-solidary cluster rejects cultural minorities and is more inactive than the inclusive solidary group. At the same time, exclusive clusters reject both social and cultural minority groups and are also inactive; both exclusive groups primarily support the right-wing populist ÖVP and FPÖ.
- 4) Social status plays a role both in Austria and Hungary: however, high status does not necessarily lead to inclusiveness: among exclusive groups, we could find relatively high status holders as well. Low status, however, certainly leads to exclusivity. In Hungary, this exclusive solidarity is based on ethnicity, because it would only exclude cultural minorities. In Austria, however, exclusive groups exclude not only cultural, but also social minorities, so their approach is either neoliberal or self-lifting, and it would be worth clarifying this with further research.
- 5) In other words, in both countries we can explain inclusive solidarity primarily by cognitive reasons: they are characterized by open mindedness, the protection of social and cultural minorities in need, and a more left-wing political orientation.
- 6) However, we did not get clear pictures about the effects of perceptions of socio-economic changes on solidarity: but we tend to assume that it has a little effect on the formations of solidarity in the studied countries rather!
- 7) In contrast to the literature, collective relative deprivation is an important driver of inclusive forms of solidarity in Hungary, while we did not find such shreds of evidence in Austria (at least on the basis of regressions and interviews), nor to the influence of political trust.
- 8) In Austria, social activity plays an essential role in solidarity, however: only the inclusive solidary groups are really active (most probably due to the secure life standard, the strong civil society, the non-fire-trench-like political socialization and self-care etc.)

Solidarity more detailed in sociological and political context: the Hungarian case

In the SOCRIS project we found that the proportion of the inclusive solidary group is the lowest among the clusters and first and last - as mentioned above - Hungary is clearly dominated by exclusive solidary orientations and groups. In addition, the inclusive solidary group feels, in spite of its relatively high status and open-mindedness, morefold deprived and politically powerless in Hungary and, they are overrepresented among left-wing voters. Based on our qualitative interviews, these frustrations can

be explained by the fact that inclusive solidary values are not at all supported by everyday political discourses of the leading media and political actors and the majority of the population.

On the contrary, the exclusive groups in Hungary (some 2/3 of the society), despite of their more modest objective living conditions compared to the average and more rural social background, feel clearly appreciated and well among the new political and social circumstances. They show up strong trust towards the regime, their majority would vote for the Fidesz and, as the regime itself, they are authoritarian and stand out a very narrow scope of solidarity, practically a kind of strong tribalism. These results are in line with qualitative findings, where fired-up majoritarian preferences and old innervations blaming left-liberals and “foreign powers” for all the problems appear in the country and the supremacy of “natural Hungarian small communities” meet the governmental populist, scapegoating and at the same time folkish buzzwords and result in feelings of appreciation and satisfaction.

No question that these strong, supposedly irreconcilable attitudinal and political tensions between exclusive and inclusive solidary groups can lead to further polarization and disintegration of the Hungarian society.

We validated our model used in SOCRIS project with the help of ESS data by comparing 4th (2008) and 8th (2016) rounds. Both rounds included inclusive and exclusive values and solidarity dimensions more or less compatible with those we used in the SOCRIS questionnaire. Based on this, a dramatic change can be observed concerning inclusive solidarity in Hungary: the proportion of active aged people belonging to the inclusive solidary cluster decreased from 34% to 23% over close one decade. The ratio of inclusive non-solidary cluster declined as well (from 26% to 17%), while the proportion of exclusive solidary cluster increased from 24% to 35%. Besides, the ratio of the exclusive non-solidary group has grown from 16% to 24% during the investigated 8 years.

While the proportions of different solidary patterns within the left-wing opposition did not change much over time (with the exception of the exclusive solidary group, which ratio decreased from 21% to 15%, while the proportion of inclusive non-solidary group increased from 26% to 32% between 2008 and 2016), the structure of these patterns within Fidesz voters and sympathisers shows up dramatic changes in a contradictory way: the proportion of inclusive non-solidary group decreased from 28% to 18%, while the ratio of the inclusive solidary group fell radically from 35% to 16%. On the contrary, the proportion of the exclusive non-solidary cluster increased from 15% to 25%, while the ratio of the exclusive solidary group raised from 26% to 40%.

Turning to the willingness giving state support of refugees as a possible indicator of universalism we found that its level is extremely low in the country, however, lower than the ratios of inclusive solidary groups. This means that the picture is rather mixed: refusal of refugees is more widespread among the Hungarian respondents, which could also be a consequence of the governmental xenophobic/populist agitation and moral panic during the so-called “refugee crisis” as many earlier presented research implied it, as well as the impact of general distancing of the Hungarians from foreigners.

The strongest explanatory factor of supporting refugees is political orientation. In a politically clearly polarized and broken-in-half society like Hungary works mostly a fire-trench logic: someone is either for or against the regime and its propagated slogans and values. However, widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories concerning refugees and immigrants is a new phenomenon. In an ethnically rather homogenous society, foreigners seem to be as a cultural and economic threat for the majority,

especially in times of crises. But, those who would give *less support* for refugees are unequivocally (far) right-wingers. Using political orientation as an explanatory variable of refugee support controlled by qualitative interviews and focus groups makes us presume that the right-wing populist's propaganda won home: the campaign against refugees most probably caused a serious moral panic among the Hungarian people after 2015, first of all among right-wing voters.¹ Nevertheless, the high level of welfare chauvinism has to be mentioned here: more than half of the respondents would give less support for refugees, while further 30% would give the same level of support in a country, which notoriously violates the most international agreements concerning the treatment of asylum seekers.

Willingness to help more for socially disadvantaged groups goes many times hand in hand with more inclusiveness and through this with more universalistic attitudes, like the support of refugees. This means that those who refuse cultural minorities like refugees are more prone to refuse social minorities in needy situations as well. Here we find a clear correlation between ethnic-based welfare chauvinism and welfare populism based on meritocracy, where all groups in need are perceived as welfare scroungers. These results support longitudinal project's findings mentioning that the Orbánian anti-poor social policy had serious negative effects to solidary attitudes of the population.

Not surprisingly, belonging to certain solidary groups are also important factors creating more vs. less positive attitudes towards refugees. However, exclusive solidarity (as welfare chauvinism and populism and through this the fear of "wasting" state resources for "undeserved"), is even a stronger factor of the refusal of refugees than exclusivist, completely non-solidary stances, which might show the success of the right-wing populist's propaganda against the poor, "undeserved" and foreigners again. Authoritarianism is an explanatory factor regardless of political orientations and belongs to solidary groups: more closed-minded authoritarian stances lead to more refusal of refugees. The irrespective effect of authoritarianism can offer a key to a better understanding of the effect of a clearly charisma based, authoritarian governance: creating a moral panic and at the same time lashing up authoritarian reflexes by the government is a terrific combination for making political capital against a non-existing enemy by the promise of restoring security and order in a supposedly "threatened" country. This is the politics, which is the impulsive force of a hybrid regime; this is what Orbán extremely well can.

However, social status, gender and age do not explain the level of support of refugees, which means that in all social strata and socio-demographic groups we find supporters, subjective wellbeing still has an explanatory power: those with feelings of higher wellbeing are more prone to support refugees, which can show here the underlying effects of the higher status among inclusive solidary groups.

In sum, by and large, the integration of the Hungarian society can seriously be eroded by attitudinal and political tensions between rather inclusive and exclusive groups. This phenomenon is even more alarming if we take into consideration that closed-mindedness and far-right attitudes and associated exclusive forms and even complete refusal of solidarity compose the majoritarian stances in Hungary, which can strongly be linked to the support of populist governmental forces in power.

¹ Interestingly, perceptions of socio-economic changes/crises played no significant role here, while belonging to different political camps are the strongest explanatory factor of supporting refugees. This shows that not economic perceptions, but first of all political cleavages might explain universalism.