FINAL REPORT

Legislator activities and electoral performance
(Project ID: PD 115747)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION[1]

Repeated elections are the ultimate means of holding politicians accountable. A vast empirical literature focuses on how voters keep parties and governments accountable by means of retrospective voting, but outside the US context much less is known about the relationship between individual parliamentarians and the selectorate on the one hand, and voters on the other. The majority of authors seem to agree with Mayhew's oft-cited starting point, and consider Members of Parliament (MPs) as 'single-minded seekers of re-election' (Mayhew, 1974). Consequently, most of the things representatives do in the present are attributed to the MPs' individual desire for future re-election. At the same time, securing access to the ballot (re-selection) is a necessary condition to be re-elected (Hazan and Rahat, 2010); and in electoral systems with party lists, re-election chances improve as candidates get higher on the party lists. Therefore, if parliamentarians wish to be re-elected, they must take gatekeeper preferences into account to an extent determined by electoral institutions. Nevertheless, even in safe districts, to maintain the electoral base, it might appear to be reasonable to follow strategies that highlight the individual legislator without endangering party unity. By this reason, every research that wants to focus on personal accountability has to take into account both the re-selection and re-election of representatives.

Within the premises of legislative studies, less attention has been paid to whether MP behaviour in parliament and in the constituency indeed affects electoral performance. Extensive research has been done on the determinants of legislator behaviour, all based on the presumption that the MPs' perceptions on the utility of their work is more important than the actual electoral benefit. Legislators work more and better because *they think* it will increase their re-election chances regardless of whether this is indeed the case. While this argument holds in several cases, it does not bring scholars closer to understanding the implications of MP behaviour and whether it is realistic to assume that such behaviour yields improved chances for being re-selected and re-elected. Following this, the main question of this project was *whether there is a connection between activities carried out by legislators and their performance at the next elections*, where performance is perceived on both stages, nomination by the selectorate and election by the voters.

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[1] For this report, I borrowed text from the following papers, submitted manuscripts and published articles. Zsófia Papp (2018) Same Species, Different Breed: The Conditional Effect of Legislator Activities in Parliament on Re-Selection in a Mixed-Member Electoral System. *Parliamentary Affairs*, online first; Zsófia Papp & Federico Russo (2018) Parliamentary Work, Re-Selection and Re-Election: In Search of the Accountability Link. *Parliamentary Affairs*, online first; Zsófia Papp (manuscript) Votes, Money Can Buy. The Conditional Effect of EU Structural Funds on Government MP's Electoral Performance, R&R in *European Union Politics*; Zsófia Papp (paper) Policy Responsiveness Under Mixed-Member Electoral Rules. The Substantive Representation of Rural Interests in the Hungarian Parliament. In the case of co-authored work, the co-author has agreed the text to be used in the final report.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT

The project had three pillars (or mini-projects), each of them approaching the problem from a different angle. (1) The first pillar focused on the relationship between the amount of work MPs carry out in parliament, and whether they are re-selected and re-elected. (2) The second mini-project evolved around the topic of pork barrel politics, and used Structural Fund data to assess the effect of pork on the legislators' electoral performance at the next elections. (3) The third part of the research dealt with the problem of issue representation, and investigates the link between district profile and the representation of certain issues in parliament. This is then latter connected to legislator vote shares, hypothesizing that legislators who are more sensitive to district profile are also more successful in securing votes at the next elections.

3. DATA

To reach the goals of the project, extensive data collection was needed. In the following, I give a list of datasets that were built to serve the aims of the work. Each pillar of the project utilized different combinations of these data. Some were used in all mini-projects; some are specific to a given topic. The listed data were gathered from various sources. The datasets were merged using ID variables, which interns imputed into all datasets manually.

1) An extensive dataset of Hungarian MPs' socio-demographics and their activities in parliament from 1990 to 2010. This dataset is fundamentally different from previously designed datasets on parliamentarians in its structure and also its variables. Data was collected from the official website of the Hungarian *Országgyűlés* (http://www.parlament.hu/, and http://www-archiv.parlament.hu/)

2) A dataset of electoral results based on the Hungarian EAST PaC dataset, which covers the time period between 1990 and 2010. The Hungarian EAST Pac data (which was also designed partly by myself) was complemented by constituency-level electoral data, such as variables about the competitiveness of the district, or electoral margin. The source of the data is the website of the National Election Office (http://www.valasztas.hu/).

3) A dataset of Structural Fund allocations to the Hungarian settlements. The data contains information on grant applications from two application periods (2007-2010, 2010-2014). The data was made available by the Department for Monitoring and Evaluation at the Prime Minister's Office. Complementary variables were coded for his PhD by Gergő Medve-Bálint who graciously let me use this data.

4) A dataset of district characteristics (the share of agricultural population). Census and micro-census data were used to measure agricultural population. Unfortunately, as data was not available at the Central Statistical Office in a digitalized format, interns entered data manually from data yearbooks and census reports found in various libraries in Budapest. Also, as

information only from the years 1990, 2001 and 2005 were available, the values for in-between election years had to be estimated linearly.

5) A dataset of parliamentary questions from 1990 to 2010. The dataset was borrowed from the Hungarian part of the Comparative Agendas Project (http://cap.tk.mta.hu/en), and complemented with a couple of key variables.

4. METHODS

Throughout the project, mostly quantitative methods were used. As to data-generating methods, besides *systematic data collection* from openly available sources, *content analysis* was applied to identify agricultural questions in the third pillar of the project. Datasets were designed both in wide and long forms depending on which did best suit the actual task at hand. Wide and long forms are features of datasets containing repeated measures. In wide form, a subject's (in this case MP's) features are placed in a single row, and a variable is repeated as many times as there are observations on that subject throughout the entire time span. In long form, on the other hand, each subject appears in the dataset as many times are there are observations on them. Although the data were set up in various forms, panel data is always analysed in long form.

With regards to the methods of data analysis, the unit of analysis (with the exception of one mini-project) is the individual MP. As we follow a relatively large number of individuals (large N) throughout a relatively short period of time (small T), the data can be handled as panel. Since there are also MPs who did not participate in every single election under investigation, the panel is fairly unbalanced. To model the dependent variables and taking into account repeated measures mixed-effects regressions were used; particularly mixed-effects linear models, logit, negative binomial and gamma models. In the case of investigating the effect of pork barrel politics on electoral performance, the unit of analysis is the settlement. In this case, as there are no repeated measures, simple OLS regression was used with SMD (or MP)-clustered standard errors.

5. RESULTS[2]

5.1 Legislative activity, re-selection and re-election

In the first pillar the question I seek answer to is whether or not the amount of work legislators carry out in parliament affects their chances of re-selection and re-election. Throughout the analysis, I experimented with four different dependent variables: (1) candidate vote share at the next elections, (2) nominated in SMD, (3) nominated on party list, as well as (4) relative list position on party lists. The analysis covers the period between 1998 and 2010.

5.1.1 Re-selection

The starting point of this study was that selectors aim at selecting legislators who are willing to carry out activities expected from their groups. In a mixed-member electoral system, SMD MPs are encouraged to work in their constituencies, while list MPs should focus more on parliamentary work. However, list MPs are not alike either: some are expected to run in SMDs at the next elections, which may change the balance between constituency and parliamentary work. Accordingly, it was expected that (H1) selectors do not take prior parliamentary activity into account when making the decision about SMD nominations, and that (H2) at party list nominations, parliamentary activities play a greater role in the case of MPs formerly not nominated in SMDs, than in the case former SMD candidates (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Predicted probabilities from the mixed effects logit models explaining whether or not MPs were re-selected on party lists

Both hypotheses of the article have been confirmed: the mixed-effects regression models did not indicate the significant effect of activity in parliament on SMD re-nominations, but in the case of party list nomination, within the group of those formerly not having been selected in SMDs,

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[2] Model results are only presented and explained in cases when the models did not make it into the final papers drafted in the topic of the certain pillars, and in the cases of conference papers. Results of manuscripts on the second stage of the review process and of published papers are not detailed here. Nevertheless, I use effect plots to visualise model results from all sources.

more active legislators manage to improve their re-selection chances. These results indicate that even if only to a moderate extent parties evaluate MPs along how well they carry out the tasks dedicated to their groups. Nevertheless, the effect size indicates that MPs have to work enormously hard to considerably better re-selection prospects. The low effect size raises the question whether—despite the significant results—MPs are encouraged at all to working harder in parliament to achieve re-selection.

5.1.2 Re-election

Explaining candidate vote share, obviously, party vote share explains a huge proportion of the variance. 1 %points increase in the party's vote share in the SMD increases the candidate's vote share by 0.88 %points. A perfect correspondence between the candidate's and the party' vote share would be indicated by a coefficient around 1. The fact that the change in the party vote share does not induce the same size of a change in the candidate vote share, leaves space for other variables to step in. Among the key independent variables only the number of speeches appears to be significant. Its positive coefficient indicates that the more frequently an MP has the floor in the parliament, the larger the share of votes she can expect at the next elections.

Table 1. Multilevel model explaining candidate vote share

Variables	DV: Candidate vote share at t
	Coefficients (s.e.)
Activity variables	
Bills (logged)	-.02 (.03)
Questions (logged)	-.01 (.04)
Speeches (logged)	.32 (.09)***
Committee	-.47 (.31)
Control variables	
Time (t)	-.15 (.12)
Party vote share in SMD (t)	.88 (.03)***
SMD MP (t)	.58 (1.05)
Regional list MP (t)	.38 (1.00)
SMD candidate (t-1)	
Tenure (t)	.24 (.33)
Joint candidate (t)	.71 (.88)
Dominant party (t)	.03 (.85)
Government party (t)	-1.31 (.64)**
District competition (t)	-1.09 (.36)***
Multiple candidacies (t)	-5.22 (3.04)*
Mayor (t)	1.79 (.78)**
Minister (t)	-.82 (.82)
Party leader (t)	-.57 (.57)
Parliamentary position (t)	.44 (.66)
Committee chair (t)	.12 (.45)
Constant	325.98 (243.65)
N	288
id sd(_cons)	2.40 (1.05)
sd(Resid)	2.72 (.32)
Log(pseudolikelihood)	-771.
Wald χ^2	9932.90***

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Besides the insignificant effects of the other activity variables, they do not point to the expected direction: the number of bills, questions and committee memberships effect vote share

negatively. To disentangle the effect of questioning, I checked if the frequency with which MPs use the different question types influences their vote share at the next elections. The results are shown in Table 2. The coefficients suggest that generally there are no statistically significant differences between the various types of questions. However, we also find an exception: the number of direct questions slightly increases vote share.

Table 2. The effect of the different question types on candidate vote share

Variables	DV: Candidate vote share at t
	Coefficients (s.e.)
Parliamentary questions	
Interpellations (logged)	-.02 (.03)
Oral questions (logged)	-.03 (.02)
Written questions (logged)	.01 (.03)
Direct questions (logged)	.06 (.03)**
Control variables included	
N	288
id sd(_cons)	2.46 (1.11)
sd(Resid)	2.69 (.36)
Log(pseudolikelihood)	-771.60
Wald χ^2	10802.81***

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Apart from party vote share the government/opposition divide, district competition and mayoral positions affect candidate vote share. As to the government/opposition divide, voters appear to punish government MPs at the next elections. Karácsony (2006) has shown that voters evaluate parties retrospectively on the basis of government performance. The reason for the negative effects is that Hungarian voters have unrealistic expectations of the governments' ability to improve the economic environment[3]. Therefore, voters may end up punishing governments that execute successful economic policies. Furthermore, as voters pursued trial-and-error tactics, a large share of votes was protest in nature, and at the same time, a proclamation of trust toward the new government (Karácsony, 2006; Rose, 1992). The effect of district competition is straightforward: the larger the number of effective candidates in the district, the smaller the share of votes a competing candidate may get. And finally, being a mayor boosts vote share by 1.79 %points, which suggests that voters take local attachments seriously when casting a personal vote.

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[3] Duch (2001) argues that in new democracies, voters cannot have established ideas on what to expect from governments.

5.2 Structural Funds and electoral performance

In the second mini-project my starting point is that Members of Parliament are thought to attract funding into their constituencies to increase their local support, and eventually, secure re-election. Nevertheless, there is only limited research focusing on the question whether or not increased government funding indeed affects the MPs' electoral performances. I use settlement level EU Structural Funds data between 2006 and 2010 to explain the electoral performance of single member district MPs at the 2010 Hungarian general elections. Particularly, I test two hypotheses.

H1. Government MPs benefit from allocation Structural Funds to the district to a greater extent than opposition MPs.

H2. The positive effect of Structural Funds for a government MP is larger in a settlement with a government mayor compared to a settlement with an opposition mayor.

I use Hungary as a case for three reasons. Firstly, as the EU's less developed regions receive the majority of the support, Central and Eastern European countries, such as Hungary are amongst the top beneficiaries. Between 2007 and 2010 3,500 billion HUF (approx. 11.4 billion EUR) was allocated to Hungary. Secondly, during the period under investigation (2006-2010), Structural Funds are domestically distributed by a central government agency (National Development Agency), thus fund allocation is under exclusive government control. Hence, the role of the government parties is clear in attracting funds in to the constituencies. Thirdly, as shown by Dellmuth, Schraff and Stoffel (2017) the comparative incentive offered by single member districts over PR exists also in the case of SF distributions. Hence, Hungary's mixed-member electoral system with its prominent (45.6 percent) SMD tier is an ideal setting for testing the hypotheses of this study.

The results confirm both hypotheses. The dashed line on Figure 2 shows how the settlement-level electoral performance of the MP changes if the MP is from a government party. The solid line indicates the same, only for opposition MPs. The slopes reveal that increasing SF value increases the settlement-level performance of government MPs, and decreases opposition results, and thus confirms the first hypothesis.

Figure 2. The conditional effect of total SF value on electoral performance in the settlement

As to the second hypothesis, in the case of government MPs (right-hand side of Figure 3), the effect of SF value is positive on electoral performance irrespective of the government status of the mayor. However, if the mayor is supported by a government party (dashed line), voters reward government MPs to a greater extent, than they do it in settlements with opposition mayors (solid line). We can see this from that the dashed line is significantly steeper than the solid one. Voters have it easier to decide who to reward if both the MP and the mayor of the settlement is a government politician. These results confirm the second hypothesis.

On the other hand, opposition MPs do not seem to benefit from increasing SF (see the left-hand side of Figure 3) regardless of the mayor's affiliation. Nevertheless, in settlements with a government mayor (dashed line), opposition MPs are significantly worse off, than in municipalities where the mayor is supported by the opposition (solid line). Given this data, we can only speculate that with increasing funding voters rather support government candidates (i.e. challengers of opposition MPs) than opposition MPs.

Figure 3. The conditional effect of total SF value across MP and mayor government status

To summarize the above, the results of both models suggest that government MPs benefit from attracting funding into the settlement, but their gain in votes is larger in settlements with government mayors. Conversely, increasing funding does not help opposition MPs to improve their electoral performance; on the contrary, it even worsens their results in the case of cohabitation. The only exceptions to this are settlements with opposition MPs and opposition mayors. In these cases, the effect of funding on the opposition MP's electoral performance is negligible. Thus, it seems, that for opposition MPs pork barrel politics is not a good attractor of votes.

The findings have consequences in two broader areas. First, offering true incentives to vote gathering, successful pork barrel politics invites additional targeted funding in areas with a friendly political climate, and therefore, it may re-directs funding from less developed regions. Second, from the perspective of local representation, pork barrel politics creates the electoral connection. MPs become interested in lobbying for the interests of their districts. However, this is only true for government MPs, thus local representation improves only partially, again, in government friendly areas. On the other hand, based on the results, it is also true that for government parties giving money to settlements with either opposition MPs or opposition mayors does not hold the risk of strengthening the opposition in that settlement. Therefore, developing regions may be beneficiaries of Structural Funds irrespective of their political leaning without sabotaging the government's electoral performance.

## 5.3 District features, parliamentary work and electoral performance

In the third pillar of the project, the focus is on the policy responsiveness of Hungarian MPs on the perceived preferences of their constituents. Policy responsiveness is considered an effective tool of representing the aggregated interests of a well-defined group of voters. Given the information scarcity about voter opinion, the profile of the constituency might serve as a shortcut legislators can use in calibrating their parliamentary work. However, electoral rules may affect how MPs react to differences in district profiles. This paper asks the question *whether or not legislators in a mixed-member electoral system react to the profile of the constituency on the course of their parliamentary work, and if yes, whether the magnitude of their reaction is dependent upon what type of mandate they hold.* I answer these questions by using data on Hungarian MPs' parliamentary questions, committee assignments and the socio-demographic profile of the constituencies regarding agriculture for three consecutive electoral terms (1998-2010).

When selecting the policy issue along which I analyse legislator behaviour, I established three criteria. First, taken into account the whole post-transition period, the issue had to be one of the most important policy issues. Second, the issue should be unambiguously connected to district characteristics. Third, people concerned with the issue should more or less have the same interests along with the issue, so that the saliency of the issue in the legislator's parliamentary activity indeed reflects some kind of aggregate interests.

Using the Hungarian data from the Comparative Agendas Project, the most important issues were identified. Figure 4 shows the frequency of interpellations regarding the various policy areas tabled between 1990 and 2014 in the Hungarian parliament. Interpellations the most important parliamentary questions in a sense that it has the largest backing: the questioning MP may decline the cabinet's answer to the interpellation which directly results in a plenary vote on the answer. Despite being the most powerful tool of government control, government parties regularly question their own ministers, typically advertising the government's achievements. Additionally, as interpellations are oral forms of questioning with strict timing rules, parties control of what gets onto the agenda. Therefore, interpellations are good estimations on the political agenda in the various time periods.

On Figure 4, the black line represents agricultural interpellations. Data indicates that agriculture was a rather important issue during the respective period. Other important areas are health, transportation, law and crime and government operations. However, as all being rather overarching, none of these may be as easily connected to certain district characteristics as agricultural issues. Furthermore, the interests of people living from agriculture is more homogeneous than those directly concerned with government operations for instance. Hence, agriculture appears a good a choice for the purposes of this paper.

Figure 4. The frequency of agricultural interpellations between 1990 and 2014

Note: dark line represents agricultural interpellations

Based on the above, the hypotheses of the paper may be specified as follows.

H1a. The larger the share of the agricultural population in the MP's constituency of nomination, the larger the number of agricultural questions.

H1b. The larger the share of the agricultural population in the MP's constituency of nomination, the more likely it is that the MP is a member of the Agricultural Committee.

H2a. The increase in the number of agricultural questions to a one unit increase in the share of agricultural population is larger in the case of SMD MPs than in the case of list MPs.

H2b. The increase in the probability of membership in the Agricultural Committee to a one unit increase in the share of agricultural population is larger in the case of SMD MPs than in the case of list MPs.

Models 1-4 of Table 3 test the effect of the agricultural population on the number of agricultural questions (H1a). Results of Models 1-4 indicate that no matter the question type, district profile affects the number of questions asked by legislators. As the independent variable is a logarithm, a 1 percent increase in the agricultural population increases the number of questions by 0.45, 0.47, 0.33 and 0.19 respectively. In other words, a 2.22, a 2.13, a 3.03 and a 5.26 percent increase in the agricultural population increases the number of interpellations, oral, direct and written questions by 1. The effect of mandate type is consistently positive, though only significant in the cases of oral and written questions: SMD MPs ask 1.07 and 0.83 more oral and written questions respectively than list MPs by 1 percent increase in the agricultural population.

Table 3. Random effects negative binomial regressions explaining the number of agricultural questions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Interpellation	Oral	Direct	Written
Variable	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)
Independent variables				
Agricultural population (logged)	**0.45 (0.12)***	**0.47 (0.13)***	**0.33 (0.13)***	**0.19 (0.08)***
SMD MP	0.48 (0.32)	1.07 (0.34)*	-0.13 (0.32)	0.83 (0.23)*
Controls				
Tenure	-0.17 (0.13)	0.09 (0.14)	0.03 (0.13)	0.12 (0.09)
Mayor	0.10 (0.69)	-0.46 (0.49)	-0.75 (0.56)	0.05 (0.34)
Local council member	-0.67 (0.58)	0.48 (0.40)	0.60 (0.43)	0.34 (0.28)
Local origin	0.38 (0.24)	0.23 (0.27)	-0.04 (0.27)	0.06 (0.19)
Small party	0.94 (0.27)*	0.31 (0.30)	2.00 (0.31)*	-0.52 (0.25)*
Government MP	-0.90 (0.25)*	-0.71 (0.23)*	-0.28 (0.23)	-1.99 (0.19)*
Party leader	-0.57 (0.32)	-0.99 (0.36)*	-0.59 (0.32)	0.10 (0.21)
Electoral security	1.31 (1.57)	3.34 (1.73)	-3.15 (1.70)	1.78 (1.34)
Constant	0.33 (0.70)	1.45 (0.85)	1.04 (0.85)	-0.12 (0.54)
N	853	860	853	862
Log likelihood	-297.26	-392.22	-329.32	-825.02
Wald Chi2	53.29*	48.54*	61.72*	146.08*

$* \ p < 0.05$

Testing if there are differences between MPs holding different mandate types, I included interaction terms into the above models. Figure 5 visualizes the interaction effects of agricultural population and mandate type across the four question types. Both in the cases of direct and written questions, the increase in the districts' agricultural population increases the number of questions asked by the SMD MPs (dashed line), while the frequency of such questions remains virtually unchanged within the group of list MPs (solid line). In the case of interpellations and oral questions, list MPs react to changes in district profile the same way as SMD MPs: increasing agricultural population increases the number of agricultural questions.

Figure 5. Interaction effects of the agricultural population and mandate type in explaining the number of agricultural questions


Looking at committee assignments, models in Table 4 suggest a positive effect for the size of the agricultural population on the chance of sitting in the Agricultural Committee. 1 percent increase in the share of the agricultural population increases this probability 2.9 times, which confirms H2a. This effect is consistent across different mandate types as well (model not presented here): list MPs are just as responsive to district demand as SMD MPs (see also Figure 6).

Table 4. Random effects binary logistic regression explaining membership in the Agricultural Committee

Variable	Model 9 Coef. (SE)
Independent variables	
Agricultural population (logged)	**1.07 (0.33)***
SMD MP	-0.09 (0.64)
Agricultural population (logged) * SMD MP	
Controls	
Tenure	0.39 (0.26)
Mayor	-1.45 (1.15)
Local council member	1.38 (0.93)
Local origin	0.76 (0.60)
Small party	0.54 (0.73)
Government MP	0.33 (0.47)
Party leader	-2.24 (0.92)*
Electoral security	1.43 (3.66)
Constant	-2.00 (1.44)
N	870
Log likelihood	-190.41

* p < 0.05

Figure 6. Interaction effects of the agricultural population and mandate type in explaining committee membership

As presented above, the analysis finds mixed results. In all cases, the share of agricultural population increases the efforts MPs make to represent agricultural interests in parliament. However, as to the difference between SMD and list MPs, only in the cases of written and direct question was any difference found. At this point, one can only speculate about the reason behind this. However, it seems plausible that the uneven distribution of legislator resources explain the differences between parliamentary activities.

As one of the perks of the office, SMD MPs have more resources at their disposal than list MPs. Therefore, list MPs have to make choices between the different types of activities they

engage in. Activities with the largest presumed impact are prioritized over activities of secondary importance. Among the different question types, interpellations and oral question may be considered high-impact, whereas direct and written questions receive a smaller portion of the spotlight. Similarly, membership in the Agricultural Committee gives MPs a larger say in agricultural legislation, and the distribution of agricultural funds, which makes these positions high on the list of priorities of all MPs connected to SMDs.

6. DISSEMINATION

Papers written during the project are at different stages of dissemination: (1) published articles, (2) manuscripts under review, (3) conference papers, and (4) working papers. Hungarian papers are currently work in progress. To avoid conflict with the international submissions, I submit Hungarian papers after the second round of reviews in the international journals. I plan to submit one Hungarian paper in each of the topics.

6.1 Legislative activity, re-selection and re-election

6.1.1 Publications

Papp, Zsófia (2018) Same Species, Different Breed. The Conditional Effect of Legislator Activities in Parliament on Re-selection in a Mixed-Member Electoral System. *Parliamentary Affairs* (IF = 1.232), Online first, 31 January, 2018., https://academic.oup.com/pa/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pa/gsx049/4831464

Papp, Zsófia & Federico Russo (2018) Parliamentary Work, Re-selection and Re-election: In Search of the Accountability Link. *Parliamentary Affairs* (IF = 1.232), Online first, 31 January, 2018, https://academic.oup.com/pa/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pa/gsx047/4831462

With Federico Russo, I co-edited a special section in Parliamentary Affairs covering the topic in a selection of countries.

6.1.2 Conference papers

Papp, Zsófia (2016) Legislator activities in parliament and electoral performance in a mixed-member electoral system. The case of Hungary, 1998-2010. Paper presented at the IPSA World Congress in Poznan, 25 July 2016

Papp, Zsófia (2016) Legislator activities in parliament and electoral performance in a mixed-member electoral system. The case of Hungary, 1998-2010. Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference in Prague, 9 September 2016

At the IPSA Congress, our group organised 3 panels, where we alternated in the co-chair and discussant positions. The best papers presented at these panels were then invited to be submitted to the special section in Parliamentary Affairs.

6.2 Structural Funds and electoral performance

6.2.1 Manuscript under review

Papp, Zsófia (ms) Votes, money can buy. The conditional effect of EU Structural Funds on government MP's electoral performance. This paper is currently in the second round of review at European Union Politics (IF = 2.052).

6.2.2 Conference papers

Papp, Zsófia (2017) Votes, money can buy. The effect of EU Structural Funds on government MP's electoral performance. Paper presented at the 7th Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association in Milan, Italy, 22-24 June 2017

Papp, Zsófia (2017) Votes, money can buy. The effect of EU Structural Funds on government MP's electoral performance. Paper presented at the 4th Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Parliaments, Basel, Switzerland, 29 June – 1 July 2017

6.3 District features, parliamentary work and electoral performance

6.3.1 Conference paper

Papp, Zsófia (2018) Policy responsiveness under mixed-member electoral rules. The substantive representation of rural interests in the Hungarian Parliament. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Nicosia, Cyprus, 10-14 April 2018. The paper will be submitted to a special issue in West European Politics (IF = 2.512)

6.3.2 Working paper

Papp, Zsófia (wp) Farmers' choice. The electoral reward of issue representation in a mixed-member system. Paper to be presented at the ECPR General Conference, Hamburg, Germany, 22-25 August 2018.

6.4. Related work

These papers, although not directly part of the three pillars of the project, use substantively similar data, and are based in the same theoretical framework. All papers acknowledge being supported by this grant.

6.4.1. Publications

Papp, Zsófia (2018) Candidate Features and Candidate Selection Patterns in Hungary, 1994-2010. *International Journal of Sociology*, 48(1): 76-93.

Papp, Zsófia & Zorigt Burtejin (2018) Political Constraints and the Limited Effect of Electoral System Change on Personal Vote-Seeking in Hungary. *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 32(1): 119-141.

Papp, Zsófia (2017) Challenging the Odds: Incumbency Disadvantage, Local Ties, and Electoral Performance In Hungary, 1994-2010. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, online first, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0888325417725785

Papp, Zsófia (2017) Mutasd a kampányod, megmondom ki vagy! Kampányperszonalizáció és képviselői tevékenységek Magyarországon. Politikatudományi Szemle, 2017(2): 35-59.

Papp, Zsófia & Zorigt Burtetin (2016) Party-directed personalization. The role of candidate selection in campaign personalization in Hungary. East European Politics, 32(4): 466-486.

Papp, Zsófia (2016) Inkumbens-hátrány, helyi kötődés és a személynek szóló szavazat Magyarországon. Politikatudományi Szemle, 25(2): 31-56.

Papp, Zsófia (2016) Shadowing the elected. Mixed-member incentives to locally oriented questioning. Journal of Legislative Studies, 22(2): 216-236

6.4.2. Accepted manuscripts

Papp, Zsófia (ms) Do Personalised Campaigns Hint at Legislator Activities? A Mixed-Member Case. *Parliamentary Affairs*

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