

## *Zárójelentés*

Németh Attila: Az istenek természetéről (PD 100418)

"Az istenek természetéről" című PD 100418 számú OTKA kutatást sikeresen befejeztem. A kutatás vezető kutatója és egyben egyetlen résztvevője Németh Attila volt, a résztvevők személyi összetételében az egész kutatás ideje alatt nem történt változás.

### A végeredmény

A kutatási tervben nem egyszerűen a téma, az antik filozófia teológiai tradícióinak tanulmányokban való feldolgozását vállaltam, hanem egy olyan angolul megírt kézirat elkészítését is, amely monografikus igénnyel mutatja be a filológia és filozófia módszereivel, Cicero *De Natura Deorum* c. dialógusából kiindulóan az antik filozófia teológiai tradícióit. A tervezetben vállalt tanulmányok és a kézirat, bár hangsúlyaikban eltérően, de a téma határain belül maradvák elkészültek.

A monográfia címe: *Epicurean Godlikeness*. Terjedeleme: 210 old., (95 903 szó).  
Témája: az epikureus teológia az epikureus morális pszichológia és felelősség tükrében.

### A végeredmény viszonya a kutatási tervben megfogalmazott célokhoz

Összességében megállapítható, hogy a monográfia kutatási tervben felvázolt szerkezetét nem sikerült megőrizni. A kutatás hangsúlyeltolódásának az okait az éves beszámolókból évről évre jeleztem, egyrészt a 2013-as, első részbeszámolóban ezt írtam: "a pályázat egyik anonim bírálójával egyetértve beláttam, hogy a kutatás spektrumát érdemes a hellenisztikus filozófiára szűkíteni"; másrészt a második részbeszámolóban, 2014-ben jeleztem, hogy a hangsúlyeltolódást kompenzáló

törekedtem a kézirat megjelentetésére egy neves angol kiadónál még a kutatás ideje alatt: "A kutatási tervet meghaladva a kézirat a mai napon (2014. április 29.) el lett küldve a Cambridge University Press-nek, ahol anonim olvasók értékelik majd ki az elvégzett munkát." A kézirat a kiadó kérésére egy újabb átdolgozáson esik éppen át, amelynek kiadott formájában az OTKA támogatás természetesen feltüntetésre fog kerülni.

### Az elkészült szöveg további sorsa

Az újabb átdolgozást követően remélhetőleg a Cambridge University Press anonim olvasói kielégítőnek fogják találni a kéziratot publikálásra. Néhány megjegyzésük az eddigi munkának a különböző fázisairól:

Reader A: This is a strong submission. The topic is a good one and N. makes some interesting and important new claims, bringing together discussions of Epicurean moral psychology, ethical improvement and moral responsibility in a way that shows the integrated and holistic nature of the Epicurean system.

Reader A2: I read the first submission of this TS and formed a generally positive impression. This second submission retains many of the good features of that original version and is a certain improvement on it. But it is still, in my judgement, in need of some important changes. Some of the critical comments I made about the first submission seem to me still to apply to this revised version. In short, I still believe that this could be an interesting monograph.

Reader B: As indicated, with these kinds of revisions and further work, I think there are definitely the makings of a worthwhile book of reasonably wide appeal here. I think revision should be encouraged and a resubmitted book appraised again.

Reader C: There is certainly a substantial amount of extremely valuable detailed work on book 25 of *On Nature*, which deserves to be published. And there is also the germ of a fresh argument about the role of the swerve in the causation of characteristically human action, an idea that may well be developable into something very fresh and important.

# Az elkészült szöveg tartalomjegyzéke

## *Epicurean Godlikeness*

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### *Synopsis*

Constant research in the history of ancient philosophy often helps us identify some further minute characteristics or stages of development in a certain area of thought. Such recognitions can come to light on account of various reasons, e.g. by understanding better some rather shadowy concepts of a philosopher or relocating some emphasis in the understanding of one's theory. Such issues are generally considered to be those of interpretation and in turn, they are due to different rationales and have to do mainly with the questions of methodology or with reflection on one's standard methodology. It is much less likely that the evaluation of some theory of a historical figure changes because of some new evidence surfacing from the past. And even if there is some such evidence, as there has been much papyrological testimony for Epicureanism for not only some decades past, but even for centuries, the focus of scholarly attention may lay somewhere else for a myriad of reasons.

It is clear that such an attitude in the particular case of the Epicurean papyri was not necessarily related to the unawareness of scholars – even if it was not before the nineteen-eighties that much attention turned to Hellenistic philosophy in general –, but it also certainly owed to reasons external to philosophical interpretation, such as the painful procedure of the decipherment of the papyri, or occasionally the consequent poor results – the published findings often seem to appear rather unintelligent or too scrappy to be worth the effort of a large scale philosophical exegesis.

But doing history of ancient philosophy is not merely a hermeneutical relation between texts and their interpreters, but it is also much about the interaction of those who are doing it, whether directly or indirectly. When Richard Sorabji's book on the

ancient conceptions of self was published,<sup>1</sup> I could not help thinking about those Epicurean papyri coming from the early parts of book XXV of *On Nature*, Epicurus' *magnum opus*, which address the conception of self-awareness, or translating the Epicurean expression more literally, the concept of 'self-thinking' (διανοεῖσθαι ἑαυτόν). Although the textual evidence is very slim and therefore it was completely reasonable that it did not perform in Sorabji's book – he, nonetheless, addressed the question of personal identity in Epicureanism through Lucretius' thought experiment of *palingenesis* –, still, the evidence has been around. And I thought they were rather important fragments since they complement Epicurus' philosophy with aspects of his theory long forgotten, namely how Epicurus conceived of self-awareness and what practical function he attributed to it in the community of his Garden.

This book pursues this subject from the beginning till the end within the framework of Epicurean theology. Epicurus' philosophy subordinates physics and metaphysics to his ethics and theology, thus making it necessary to study their complex relations. And this subordination is very important when interpreting his theory, since although Epicurus was an atomist who took it that the basic building blocks of the universe were the atoms and the void, his theory was not constructed entirely on his metaphysics from the bottom up, as it will become clear from both, his methodological principles as well as from my analysis of the textual evidence of his ideas.

It will be an examination not shy of using some modern terminology, but always conscious of the risks it may involve. It is impossible not to use certain terminology from our particular perspective in time when analysing past ideas or philosophical vocabulary not merely under-qualified but completely vague as they appear in the fragmentary state of our evidence and often having no historical precedent or antecedent as, for example, Epicurus' infamous concept of the *apogegennêmena* (τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα), literally meaning 'what have been produced'. This particular term naturally needs much interpretation if we wish to understand its function in the context of his philosophy of mind, a department also not quite conceived of in this very idiom by Epicurus. But as long as we clarify the sense in which we apply our modern terminology to ancient ideas, with the help of such qualified jargon our analysis will work much smoother.

So how are we to take the Epicurean idea of 'self'? What conception of self does the Greek reflexive pronoun *heautos* used by Epicurus in the abovementioned fragments igniting this particular discussion designate? Does this pronoun really pick out a conception of the self? Some people even questioned if the ancient philosophers had a notion of the self at all,<sup>2</sup> a worry, I think, already sufficiently refuted.<sup>3</sup> The various accounts of ancient philosophers, studied by Sorabji *inter alia*, have shown not only how diverse the usage of the Greek pronouns, the tokens of our English word

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<sup>1</sup> Sorabji 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Anscombe 1975; Kenny 1988; or Taylor 1989 for the differences between the ancient and the modern conception of the self.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gill 1996 and 2006; Sorabji 2006.

‘self’ can be in the ancient parlance – the personal pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’ in general, or the reflexive pronoun *heautos*, meaning oneself, or the pronoun *autos* used in an emphatic way meaning someone him or herself or even one’s true self –, but how much these pronouns express the strong interest of the ancients in the individual person, especially from the individual’s point of view. Yet it would truly not be sufficient to attribute the conception of self to Epicurus just on the strength of some fragmentary evidence in which he recurrently uses a reflexive pronoun, even if he most likely applies it in some sense of the ‘self’. But if we take into account his entire philosophy, nothing could be closer to the truth than that it advertises a kind of hedonism, which is based on a psychophysical ‘well-being’ or ‘happiness’ (*eudaimonia*) attained by one’s self-reflexive rational considerations. The *telos* of Epicureanism was – very much in the vein of the ancient ethical tradition – to understand one’s own nature and transform it, of course, in Epicurus’ case, in harmony with his teachings, which were advocating the possibility of a life of the perfect human condition, not less valuable than that of the gods.<sup>4</sup>

Such an ethical end was in line with the principal schools of ancient philosophy, which, as Anthony Long has put it, all raised the simple question of what to make of oneself, both, in an ontological as well as in a practical or normative sense.<sup>5</sup> On the one hand, one needs to get to know oneself in order to see one’s place in the cosmos. First one needs to evaluate one’s nature in order to be able to understand the means by which one can take care of oneself, just as Socrates pointed it out to Alcibiades in harmony with the Delphic imperative to get to know himself, so only by understanding his true character and his related social status could he have advanced appropriately on a political carrier to help others.<sup>6</sup> Even Aristotle’s ethical theory can be considered along these lines in light of his function (*ergon*) argument in book I of his *Nicomachean Ethics*: first we need to identify human function so we can take into account the best form of life. Ancient ethics, thus, seems to take a twofold characteristic, having a descriptive and a normative part. Both parts are normally supported by an elaborate metaphysics, which lend a natural foundation to ancient theories and are the framework for sketching the normative parts of their ethical theories.

But in so far as one defines oneself in relation to the world, starting from one’s own perspectives, applied ethics naturally lends a common ground for both components of an ethical theory, and that ground is the subjective conception of the self. As it was the case with the Epicureans – as we will see clearly from Epicurus’ *Letter to Menoceous*, an epitome of his ethics –, self-introspection took its cue from the observation of one’s own desires and the scrutiny of the means to their satisfaction, thus, necessarily focusing on the individual’s current conditions. It was one’s bodily and mental conditions which provided directly accessible information about oneself, where the truth of Epicurus’ hedonism ought to have been recognised,

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. *RN*...

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Long 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Annas 1985.

since for him the only direct and objective ground for the evaluation of one's bodily and mental states was one's pleasurable and painful bodily and mental affections (*pathe*). Consequently, to form an Epicurean conception of oneself first one needed to understand how one's current dispositions were related to the satisfaction of one's desires – whether pleurably or painfully –, and then, one needed to evaluate one's own dispositions in comparison to how much one's desires conformed to Epicurus' threefold classification of desires, the basic building blocks of his normative theory. That such a self-evaluation was not possible without any social relations is clearly shown by how essential friendship and the teacher-pupil relation were for the Epicureans. It would have been impossible for the individual to apply Epicurus' normative theory without a friendly community – the idea simply being that one cannot judge *objectively* the value of one's pleasurable or painful conditions in the light of an ethical theory. Of course, one could decide and act along the desires one finds worth satisfying, and keep satisfying them on a regular basis, being simply an egoist, yet one may be completely mistaken concerning their natural value. One's consequent pleasures may be pleasurable *qua* pleasures, but they may not be choiceworthy at all, lacking the support of Epicurus' ethical theory as an objective standard. I think it is essential to recognise what this implied for one ready to become an Epicurean: in so far as one was willing to subscribe to the Master's tenets, leading a life along egoistic principles was in no avail any longer, since by joining the Garden, one had to accept criticism of the other Epicureans in order to accomplish the Epicurean natural *telos* by the constant adjustment of one's value judgements in harmony with Epicurus' teachings. One may have considered, for example, fulfilling one's desire for some wine from Lesbos an imperative for most of the time when longing for some, without recognising that one's natural desire for wine includes a non-necessary aspect, i.e. that the wine should come from Lesbos. And if one had a desire for wine merely to quench one's thirst then one would have needed to admit that in such a case the desire is not even natural, since water would suit much better one's intention, given the dehydrating effect of wine. And also, one may run up and down between one's home and country residences believing that it is one's circumstances which provide one the tranquil life, without realising that first and foremost it depends on one's internal dispositions, both, of one's body and soul,<sup>7</sup> recognitions brought to life with the help of an Epicurean community.<sup>8</sup>

But if the ethical end is so much dependent on the conditions of body and soul, where does the concept of self come in? Is it not just a convenient explanatory term, a 'modern' shortcut for summarizing Epicurus' ideas? Did Epicurus really need such a concept at all for his explanation of the hedonic psychophysical 'well-being'?

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. Lucretius *RN* III 1053-75.

<sup>8</sup> One may contest the methodology of my interpretation by saying that it is based on a combined consideration of theory and practice. But it is based, in fact, on Epicurus' imperative that the value of a theory can be measured only by its applicability, cf. Porph. *Ad Marc.* 31 = fr. 221 Us., quoted in Chapter 1, pp. 11-12.

Yes, he did, even if we will not find a definition of the self in his writings, and perhaps such a definition never even existed, which is indeed very likely given Epicurus' ignorance of definitions in general. But it is exactly this double aspect of his ethical end, the dependence of one's well-being on both, the conditions of one's body and soul, this psychophysical holism, which points to the direction of self in Epicurus' theory. One's self for Epicurus was not only one's intellectual and moral commitments, he did not merely identify one's true self with one's soul, but included all the aspects of the human condition, most importantly from an 'I' perspective.<sup>9</sup> It is from his holistic conception of one's own dispositions that his conception of the self takes its cue, through such observations as, for example, one's own causality in the world, dependent on both, one's bodily and mental conditions. According to Epicurus' hedonism, one is meant to direct oneself in the world with the help of a hedonic calculus, constantly taking into account one's bodily and mental conditions, constantly referencing one's psychophysical self.<sup>10</sup> Without an 'I' perspective bringing all these factors together such a calculus could not even work, since it is *my* psychophysical condition which is self-reflected in harmony with a normative theory to conclude a consequent action. That is to say, the hedonic calculus is applied in relation to *me*, or to my *self*.<sup>11</sup>

It is also an important aspect of the Epicurean self that that *me* or rather my *self* has to be identical over time for the calculus to work. Without any memories of the interactions between my psychophysical self and the world, I have no basis to calculate an appropriate action, since a momentary conception of the self simply would not be sufficient.<sup>12</sup> Not even Epicurus' normative ethical theory would suffice on its own as a canon for the calculation to work, since its *telos* is strongly connected with one's psychophysical condition, implying personal identity over time. As Sorabji has pointed out concerning Lucretius' idea of *palingenesis* – briefly the question being that given the infinity of time it is of necessity that one's atomic constitution will and in fact have had reassembled infinitely many times without ever constituting our present selves –, the reason that we lack a memory of our former assemblies implies that we need not be concerned about our future reassemblies either is unsatisfactory if we take into account the unsymmetrical nature between concerns of the future and the past, the former being “typically an object of concern in a way that the forgotten is not.”<sup>13</sup> Consequently he finds Lucretius' other solution to the problem more competent, interpreting lines 861-3 of *RN* III in harmony with lines of *RN* III 677-8 that it is the uninterrupted retention of memory, in the sense of the possibility for exercising the retained memory, which is the necessary condition of personal

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<sup>9</sup> *Contra* Gill 2006, p. xv.

<sup>10</sup> For the hedonic calculus cf. Chapter 1 pp. 22-4; also see Chapter 2, p. 68.

<sup>11</sup> In my view it is exactly this constant self-reflexivity why we need to use the concept of self in our analysis of Epicurus' psychophysical holism rather than another modern notion, namely that of 'agency', which appears to me to be limited to picking out one's causal responsibility.

<sup>12</sup> Thus the playwright, Epicharmus' idea of growth being a continuous destruction of one's self would not suffice, cf. Sorabji 2006 p. 57, n. 1 for references.

<sup>13</sup> Sorabji 2006 p. 98.



identity. This is very much in harmony with both, the kind of personal identity necessary for the hedonic calculus as well as the conception of the self, surfacing in the fragments of book XXV of *On Nature*. There we constantly bump into the functional part memory plays in reference to the Epicurean natural *telos*, and it only makes sense to interpret its role as an essential part in one's personal identity and consequently as an indispensable part of one's self.

Take the famous example of Epicurus counterbalancing his extreme pains on his last day with the remembrance of his past conversations with Idomeneus, one of the major figures of his school.<sup>14</sup> In order to compensate his pains, Epicurus needed memories of his own, which implies both, that the person who lived those memories was the same with the person suffering from some pains at the present, as well as that memories build one's personal identity and one's conception of one's psychophysical self. In this particular example it is some mental pleasure which counterbalances some bodily pain, both of them being part of the very same person. Such an operation would not be possible, nor should it be important if one identified oneself only with one's soul, since e.g. in a Platonic view of the body, the prison of the soul, one would rather look forward to death in a similar case to that of Epicurus in order to release one's soul. But Epicurus chose to optimize his present condition by remembrance of his past circumstances, and even if it is somewhat counter-intuitive or even counter-experimental that it is possible to compensate for one's excruciating sufferings so easily, inadvertently he pointed towards the necessary elements of his self-conception.

His conception of 'self-thinking' in accordance with both, the *pathologikos* and the *aitiologikos tropos* (the manners dealing with being affected and with the causes of things, respectively) in the early parts of book XXV of *On Nature*, will also make clear how broad his concept of the self was: he found it important to absorb into one's self-conception the opinion of others as well. Fortunately, my unavoidably speculative analysis owing to the fragmentary nature of the evidence is corroborated by some other fragmentary papyri, by the writings of the first century BC Epicurean Philodemus, whose work *On Frank Criticism* describes the constantly corrective methodology of the teacher-pupil relation in the Garden, which was also pregnant among the friends of the community as well. It was first and foremost a therapeutic method, applying different manners of verbal correction, obviously incorporating personal judgements about each other as well. Sharing the evaluative perspectives of each other meant that this constant and mutual exchange of beliefs about the others contributed to the formation of one's own identity, to one's self-knowledge. Consequently the identification of one's self was essentially connected with value judgments of oneself *by others* in the Epicurean community. These judgements obviously helped shaping one's self-conception in relation to the ethical commitments of the Epicurean social group working towards an ethical ideal, provided by Epicurus himself. The fragments of the early parts of book XXV of *On Nature* will provide some significant evidence for this understanding.

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. Diogenes Laertius X 22.

But it is the practical matters of Epicureanism where my reconstruction starts in Chapter 1, *The ethical background of godlikeness*. By examining the highest moral standard Epicurus set for his followers, his own *homoiosis theoi* – which, in fact, will turn out to be *homoiosis fusei*<sup>15</sup> personified by Epicurus himself –, we shall understand the strong interdependence between his way of life and ethical theory, and it will also open a new avenue for interpretation, namely how deeply his ethics is concerned with the conception of self and theology. The scrutiny of one's desires – the key element of his ethical theory as it will become clear in Chapter 1.2, *The pleasure of the virtues or the inter-entailment thesis* – provides the correct understanding of one's self, which can be compared to the ethical ideal already fulfilled by Epicurus himself. This comparison motivates a continuous self-improvement if one is devoted to the community gathered around Epicurus, or the later scholars of the school, which seems to have been driven by the love felt for Epicurus. Even though the master-pupil relation appears at first asymmetrical, which is enhanced by the many therapeutic arguments applied in the Garden,<sup>16</sup> the conception of self-improvement essentially implies mutual benevolence as it is attested by the friendships of the members of the Epicurean community. I will argue in Chapter 6 that love and friendship were an essential part of how the Epicureans formed an image of themselves, since their self-conception sprang from a genuinely social context, and that the friends of the Garden shared their evaluative perspectives of the moral domain.

But before that, I will investigate in Chapter 2, *Epicurus on self-awareness*, how pleasure, the natural focal point of Epicurus' theory, is articulated and integrated into one's life along one's mental development leading to one's self-conception. It is the scanty evidence of the Herculaneum papyri where such an investigation necessarily leads to given the meagre primary evidence on this subject in Epicureanism. In these fragments we can grasp how one's self-conception is based on Epicurus' idea of 'self-thinking' in accordance with both, the *pathologikos* and the *aitiologikos tropos*, as the early parts of book XXV of *On Nature* suggest.

In Chapter 3, *The physicalism of the self: a textual analysis of the central fragments of On Nature XXV*, I explore how Epicurus addressed the difficulties to which his physicalism exposed him. I give a detailed analysis of some of the ever so often scrutinized fragments from the later parts of book XXV of *On Nature*. Since discussing every claim ever made about these fragments would have resulted in a too extensive and, consequently, tedious chapter, I decided to take into account only the two major lines of interpretations – the reductionist and anti-reductionist readings of Epicurus' philosophy of mind – and the views of their two strongest advocates – those of Tim O'Keefe and David Sedley, respectively. Based on my philological and philosophical analysis of the available evidence, which, amongst other points, resulted in a new interpretation of the infamous τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα as well as of the atomic

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<sup>15</sup> As aptly put by Erler 2002, p. 172.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Nussbaum 1986, pp. 46-7.

swerve, I find that a non-reductive physicalist understanding of Epicurus' position of one's self is available.

In Chapter 4, *The morality of the divine*, I turn to the last few fragments of book XXV. In harmony with my analysis of Epicurus' metaphysical and aitiological theorising, I discuss Epicurus' conception of the self on the strength of book XXV as a whole.

Chapter 5, *Lucretius and the swerve*, is devoted to Lucretius' discussion of the atomic swerve. Once again, I preferred to investigate how my new understanding of the function of the atomic swerve fits Lucretius' explanation – and it is striking how well it actually does –, instead of giving a history of the divergent interpretations of this rather over-interpreted text. Thus, I do not wish to claim that my reading is the only possible understanding of the relevant passages, however, I hope that my arguments based on my analysis of the primary evidence are persuasive enough to take them into serious consideration.

In Chapter 6, *The friendship of divine Selves: Epicurean directions in the 1st century BCE*, I extend the scope of the investigation to Lucretius' contemporaries to study Epicurus' conception of friendship based on some of our major evidence from Cicero and Philodemus.

## Publikációs és tudományos tevékenység

### Elkészült tanulmányok:

2015: "A démokritoszi episztemológiáról." (Megjelenésre vár a 2014-es, 11. Magyar Ókortudományi Konferencia konferenciakötetében.)

2015: "Lucretius és a *similitudo divini*". (Megjelenésre vár a 2014 áprilisában a Károli Gáspár Református Egyetemen tartott konferencia anyagából összeállított kötetben.)

2014: "On Democritus' Epistemology". Még nem jelent meg.

2014: "Review of Warren, J. & Sheffield, F. (eds.) *The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, New York and London, 2013," for Bryn Mawr, during the Autumn of 2014.

Link: <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2014/2014-10-19.html>

2014: "Review of M. Schofield (ed.) *Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC*, Cambridge, 2013." *Rhizomata* May, 2014.

2013: "Cicero and the Epicurean Sorites". Még nem jelent meg.

2012: "Cicero and the Epicurean Sorites", *Ókor*, 2012/4.

### Konferencia előadások:

<b>Location</b>	<b>Date of Event</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Title</b>
International Association For Presocratic Studies, Thessaloniki	June 30 - July 4, 2014	Conference	"Democritus' B156"
Eötvös Loránd University	May 22-24, 2014	Conference	"On Democritus' epistemology"
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest Faculty	April 13-14, 2014	Conference	"Lucretius and the <i>similitudo divini</i> "
Eötvös Loránd University	May 22, 2013	Lecture	"The Unity of Virtues in the Garden"
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest Faculty	November 19-20, 2012	International Conference on Aristotle's Politics	Reflections on Prof. Attila Simon's paper, <i>Synesis as a political concept in Aristotle.</i>
University College London	October 8-10, 2012	London Ancient Science Conference	"Cicero and the Epicurean Sorites"
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Piliscsaba	May 23-26, 2012	National Conference of Ancient Science	"Cicero and the Epicurean Sorites"

### Think Tank:

A tervezett 'think tank' vagyis agytröszt a kutatóegyetem ideájának a szellemében valósult meg azáltal, hogy lehetőségem nyílt a kutatás ideje alatt az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Filozófia, illetve Latin Tanszékein a következő szemináriumokat megtartanom:

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest	2014/2015 Spring semester	Department of Philosophy	Emotions in Ancient Philosophy
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest	2014/2015 Fall semester	Department of Latin	"Cicero, <i>De Officiis</i> I" Reading seminar (with Prof. Attila Ferenczi)
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest	2013/2014 Fall semester	Department of Philosophy	"Ancient Philosophy of Mind"

Eötvös Loránd University, 2012/2013 Department of Philosophy "Theological traditions in  
Budapest Spring semester ancient philosophy"

Eötvös Loránd University, 2012/2013 Department of Philosophy "On the nature of  
Budapest Fall semester gods"

## Összefoglalás

Úgy gondolom, hogy ha eltérő hangsúlyokkal is, de sikerült a pályázati tervben kitűzött vállalásokat teljesíteni és az antik filozófia teológiai tradíciói egyik szegmensének nagy figyelmet szentelve egy hiánypótló munkát elkészíteni, amelynek szövege kisebb-nagyobb javítások, pontosítások, kiegészítések után a közeljövőben meg is jelenhet.

Köszönöm az OTKA támogatását.

Budapest, 2015 április 30.

Németh Attila